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Abstract We analyse agreements on river water allocation between riparian countries.
Besides being efficient, water allocation agreements need to be stable in order to be effective
in increasing the efficiency of water use. In this paper we assess the stability of water allo-
cation agreements using a game theoretic model. We consider the effects of climate change
and the choice of a sharing rule on stability. Our results show that a decrease in mean river
flow decreases the stability of an agreement, while an increased variance can have a positive
or a negative effect on stability. An agreement where the downstream country is allocated a
fixed amount of water has the lowest stability compared to other sharing rules. These results
hold for both constant and flexible non-water transfers.
Keywords Climate change · Game theory · Stability · Water allocation
1 Introduction
When multiple countries share a river, they compete over available water resources. The
upstream country has the first option to use water, which may obstruct the overall efficiency
of water use (Barrett 1994). Cooperation between upstream and downstream countries—in
the form of a water allocation agreement—may increase the efficiency of water use. Whether
cooperation is stable, however, depends on the design of the water allocation agreement. The
stability of water allocation agreements is the subject of this paper.
In the twentieth century, 145 international agreements on water use in transboundary rivers
were signed; almost 50% of these agreements cover water allocation issues (Wolf 1998). The
majority of these water allocation agreements does not take into account the hydrologic vari-
ability of river flow (Giordano and Wolf 2003). This is a shortcoming because variability is an
important characteristic of river flow. This variability will even increase in many river basins
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when the effects of climate change on temperature and precipitation proceed as projected
by climate simulation models (IPCC 2007b). These effects are expected to increase the var-
iability of the annual and seasonal flow patterns as well as the frequency of extreme events
in many river basins (Arnell 1999; Chalecki and Gleick 1999; Voss et al. 2002; Räisänen
et al. 2004). Recognition of flow variability in the design of water allocation agreements can
increase the efficiency of these agreements.
Several studies have addressed this issue for two common sharing rules for water alloca-
tion: proportional allocation and fixed flow allocation (for an overview of sharing rules, see
Dinar et al. 1997). Fixed flow allocations are most common (Wolf 1998) but tend to be less
efficient when flow variability increases. Bennett et al. (2000) compared the efficiency of
fixed flow allocations with proportional allocations and found that, in many situations, pro-
portional allocations are more efficient. Kilgour and Dinar (1995, 2001) developed a sharing
rule that ensures a Pareto-efficient allocation for every possible flow volume, where the level
of compensation paid by receivers of water is subject to annual bargaining. Obviously, com-
pared with a proportional or fixed flow allocation, this flexible allocation is more efficient,
but it requires accurate predictions of annual river flow and flexibility in compensation pay-
ments. In a case study of the Colorado river, Mendelsohn and Bennett (1997) found that the
loss of efficiency related to a change in mean river flow (e.g. because of climate change) is
higher for a proportional allocation than for a fixed allocation, the main reason being that the
initial proportions used were inefficient. Another result was that the largest impact of climate
change on efficiency comes from changes in the mean river flow, not from changes in the
variance. Furthermore, in an analysis of US inter-state water allocation agreements, Bennett
and Howe (1998) found that agreement compliance is higher for proportional than for fixed
flow allocations.
Apart from being efficient, water allocation agreements need to be stable in order to be
effective instruments to increase the efficiency of water use. Efficiency and stability of agree-
ments are not necessarily linked. Climate change, for instance, may increase the benefits of
cooperation to one country while decreasing those to the other, leaving overall efficiency
equal, but possibly giving the country with decreased benefits an incentive to leave the agree-
ment. Because agreements are signed between sovereign nations, there is usually no higher
level authority that can enforce compliance. The stability of agreements therefore depends
on the distribution of the benefits of cooperation to the countries involved, which can be
analysed using game theory. Recent studies (Ambec and Sprumont 2002; Wang et al. 2003;
Heintzelman 2004; Kucukmehmetoglu and Guldmann 2004; Wu and Whittington 2006)
showed that water allocation agreements can improve the efficiency of water use and that—
when benefits of cooperation are distributed properly—they can be attractive to all countries
involved. This game theoretic literature, however, does not explicitly consider the effects of
climate change on river flow and agreement stability.
The objective of this paper is to assess the stability of water allocation agreements when
climate change affects river flow. This is done by constructing a game theoretic model of
water allocation that analyses stability of three sharing rules for water allocation. Our results
show that a decrease in mean river flow decreases the stability of an agreement, while an
increased variance can have a positive or a negative effect on stability. An agreement where
the downstream country is allocated a fixed amount of water has the lowest stability compared
to other sharing rules. These results hold for both constant and flexible non-water transfers.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Sect. 2 we present background
information for our model assumptions. In Sects. 3 and 4 we present our model and assess
stability of cooperation. In Sect. 5 we assess stability effects of asymmetric countries. In
Sect. 6 we illustrate the effects of climate change on the stability of cooperation for different
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sharing rules, using a numerical example. In Sect. 7 we discuss the results, and we conclude
in Sect. 8.
2 Setting the Stage
There is no standard water allocation agreement that can serve as a basis for our model
assumptions. Because of historical, hydro-geographical, economic, and political reasons, the
institutional setting of agreements shows a large variety. In this section we provide some
evidence for this variety. We focus on three institutional aspects of water allocation agree-
ments that are important for our model assumptions: sharing rules, non-water transfers, and
reactions to noncompliance.
2.1 Sharing Rules
The vast majority of international agreements on water allocation are bilateral. In fact, less
than ten multilateral agreements on water allocation are listed in the International Freshwater
Treaties Database (e.g. the 1955 Jordan agreement based on the Johnston negotiations, that
was signed by Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria) (Beach et al. 2000). Because of this limited
number of countries in a typical agreement, sharing rules are not complex. Generally, they
are based on a combination of historical rights, economic efficiency and the principle of
“reasonable and equitable sharing”, as defined in the 1966 Helsinki Rules.
Two basic types of sharing rules are dominant. The first type, which is most common,
applies a percentage rule. An example is the 1975 Euphrates Agreement (Iran, Iraq) in which
the flows of the Bnava Suta, Qurahtu, and Gangir rivers were divided equally (Beach et al.
2000). The second type guarantees a fixed amount of water to one or both of the countries.
An example is the 1959 Agreement between Nepal and India on the Gandak irrigation and
power project, in which irrigation water was allocated for 40,000 acres in Nepal and 103,500
acres in India (Beach et al. 2000). Combinations of these sharing rules are common too.
An example is the Nile Waters Agreement (Egypt, Sudan) that allocates 48,000 MCM/yr to
Egypt and 4,000 MCM/year to Sudan, based on acquired rights. Of the remaining flow, 34%
is allocated to Egypt and 66% to Sudan (NWA 1959).
2.2 Non-water Transfers
In basins where water is scarce, water use by upstream countries goes at the expense of
downstream water use. A downstream country can acquire additional water from the upstream
country, using non-water transfers. These transfers can be lump-sum payments, as in the 1960
Indus Waters Treaty (India, Pakistan). This treaty—allocating the east tributaries of the river
to India and the west tributaries to Pakistan—included a one-time £ 62 million lump-sum
payment by India (Beach et al. 2000). These transfers can also be annual payments, as in the
Lesotho Highlands Water Project (Lesotho, South Africa). Under this treaty, South Africa
pays non-water transfers to Lesotho, increasing from e 14 million in 1998, when actual
water deliveries started, to e 24 million in 2004 (LHDA 2005). This example is exceptional
because in most cases non-water transfers are constant over time.
Another possibility is the use of transfers in-kind. Monetary payments may be difficult
from a political point of view or because the benefits from water are hard to monetise. In-kind
transfers can be achieved by linking water transfers to other issues, that provide a benefit to
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the upstream country. For example, the Netherlands linked the issue of water allocation in
the Meuse river to the issue of navigation on the Scheldt river. The Netherlands would gain
from the water allocation treaty, while Belgium would gain from the improved access to the
Antwerp harbour. Eventually, the agreement on water allocation in the Meuse was linked to
the routing of an international railway track (Mostert 2003).
There exist many water allocation agreements where non-water transfers are not part of
the agreement, for various reasons. In the Nile basin, for instance, the military threat posed
by Egypt plays an important role for the absence of non-water transfers. This threat can, nev-
ertheless, be considered as equivalent to a non-water transfer (cf. Janmaat and Ruijs 2006).
Another possible reason is that the countries involved recognise historical water use or the
equitable use of a shared resource.
2.3 Reactions to Noncompliance
In principle, an upstream country can use any available water whenever it wants, without
considering downstream water needs. History has shown that indeed upstream countries may
do this. A famous example relates to India’s construction of the Farakka barrage in the Ganges
basin. After the construction, India extended its trial operation of the barrage throughout the
1975–1976 dry season, diverting water away from the Ganges and through the new canal at
full capacity. This operation led to severe water shortages in Bangladesh (Beach et al. 2000).
A second example relates to the partitioning of the Indian subcontinent in 1947. A dispute
on water rights led India to divert all water supply away from Pakistan’s irrigation canals in
1948 (Barrett 1994). A third example is Turkey diverting all the water from the Euphrates for
a month to create a reservoir behind the newly constructed Atatürk Dam in 1990, depriving
Syria and Iraq of water.
These examples show that ultimately the upstream country has the power over shared
water resources. Water rights that are specified in a water allocation agreement cannot be
enforced by a downstream country. Especially so, because there is no higher authority that can
enforce compliance. In half of the current water allocation agreements disputes are managed
by advisory councils, governments’ conflict-addressing bodies, the United Nations, or other
third parties (Wolf 1998). The other half of the agreements does not refer to any form of
dispute resolution. The absence of a higher authority that can issue penalties is clear. As
a result, the only reasonable reaction to upstream noncompliance is to stop or reduce any
non-water transfers. This strategy can be most effective when the issue of water allocation is
linked to another transboundary issue between the two countries (Folmer et al. 1993).
In addition to a possible reduction of non-water transfers, noncompliance is likely to
lead to a temporary pause of the agreement and requests for international mediation. Exam-
ples of this situation have occurred for instance in the Indus and Euphrates basins. After
India diverted water away from Pakistan’s irrigation canals in 1948, breaking the 1947
“Standstill Agreement”, four years passed before renegotiations began. Another eight years
later and with considerable support from the World Bank, disagreement was settled and
the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty was signed (Beach et al. 2000). In the Euphrates basin, the
1987 security protocol between Turkey and Syria guaranteed Syria an annual average min-
imum flow of 500 cubic meters per second. In return, Syria would cooperate in security
matters, related to its support to the Kurdish Workers’ Party in Turkey. The agreement did
not last long as Turkey continued the construction of a large-scale irrigation project, and
Syria did not keep to its promise. Follow-up agreements in 1992 and 1993 failed for the same
reason.
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3 A Model of Cooperation
Based on the examples presented in Sect. 2, we construct a two-country model of cooperation.
A river is shared by two countries i ∈ {u, d}, having its source in the upstream country u
and subsequently flowing through the downstream country d . Qt denotes the volume of river
flow in year t that is available for use; it excludes the river flow necessary to sustain the
environmental functioning of the river system and other vital services such as navigation.
Qt is defined by probability density function f (Q) (cf. Krzysztofowicz 2001). Contributions
to river flow in d are negligible as are return flows. Climate change effects on river flow are
included in the model by adapting the probability density function from f (Q) to f ′(Q).
In year t , country i uses qi,t units of water. Because of the unidirectional flow of water,
u has the first option to use water, which may limit water use by d . All water that was not
used by u, is available for use by d:
0 ≤ qu,t ≤ Qt (1)
0 ≤ qd,t ≤ Qt − qu,t (2)
Benefits Bi,t (qi,t ) from water use are increasing and concave with a maximum at q¯i,t . Clearly,
if u maximises benefits of water use, it does not have an incentive to pass water to d that
has a positive marginal value to him. Yet, if the benefit to d of using more water out-
weighs the decrease in benefits to u, there is scope for cooperation, with u passing on water
to d , in exchange for non-water transfers. Because we are interested in such situations,
we assume water scarcity such that q¯u,t + q¯d,t ≥ E(Qt ). When the possible gains from
cooperation are fully captured, the water allocation is Pareto-efficient. More specifically,
a water allocation (qu,t , qd,t ) is Pareto-efficient for Qt , when Bu,t (qu,t ) + Bd,t (qd,t ) ≥
Bu,t (qu,t ) + Bd,t (qd,t ) ∀ (qu,t , qd,t ). An efficient agreement, however, is not necessarily
stable, as will be illustrated in Sect. 6.
We analyse three basic sharing rules:
Proportional allocation (PA): u receives αQt and d receives (1 − α)Qt , with 0 < α < 1;
Fixed upstream allocation (FU): u receives min{β, Qt } and d receives max{Qt − β, 0},
with 0 < β < E(Qt );
Fixed downstream allocation (FD): u receives max{Qt − γ, 0} and d receives min{γ, Qt },
with 0 < γ < E(Qt ).
Because of water scarcity and increasing and concave benefit functions, and because for
each of these sharing rules we have that q ′i,t ≥ qi,t if Q′t > Qt , we know that cooperation
increases total benefits of water use:
Bcu,t + Bcd,t ≥ Bnu,t + Bnd,t ∀ Qt (3)
where superscript c denotes cooperation, n denotes non-cooperation, and water use—and
therefore benefits—depends on the sharing rule agreed upon. Note that we use Bci,t and B
n
i,t
as shorthand notation for Bi,t (qci,t ) and Bi,t (q
n
i,t ). Cooperative benefits B
c
i,t are determined
by the use of one of the three sharing rules. Non-cooperative benefits Bni,t are determined by
unilateral benefit maximisation. That is, country i uses qni,t units of water such that B
n
i,t is
maximised, subject to constraints (1) and (2).
For cooperation to be attractive to u, we need to include non-water transfers mct paid by d
to u. These non-water transfers can be monetary (lump-sum or annual side payments), in-kind,
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or based on issue linking, as discussed in Sect. 2. Because of this diversity in possible non-
water transfers, we distinguish two general types of non-water transfers. Type I —denoted
by m I —has a constant value over time, representing non-water transfers that cannot be easily
adjusted over time, such as issue linking. Type II—denoted by mIIt —has a value that depends
on Qt , representing non-water transfers that can be easily adjusted to river flow in year t , such
as monetary transfers. We assume that non-water transfers are equal to the value of compen-
sation of u for benefits foregone and a share  of the additional benefits from cooperation.
The two types of non-water transfers, paid by d to u, are calculated as:
m I = E (Bnu,t − Bcu,t + 
[
(Bcd,t + Bcu,t ) − (Bnd,t + Bnu,t )
]) (4)
mIIt = Bnu,t − Bcu,t + 
[
(Bcd,t + Bcu,t ) − (Bnd,t + Bnu,t )
] (5)
with 0 ≤  ≤ 1 and E(m I ) = E(mIIt ). As can be seen from Eqs. 4 and 5, the only difference
between m I and mIIt is that m I is calculated based on expected water use instead of current
water use. Therefore, m I is constant while mIIt adjusts to river flow in year t .
This method to calculate non-water transfers is commonly used in the literature on inter-
national environmental agreements. Chander and Tulkens (1997), for instance, show that cor-
rectly designed side payments—resembling those in Eqs. 4 and 5—can stabilise international
environmental agreements in a setting of uniformly mixing pollutants. This method is also
related to the Nash bargaining solution; a common solution concept from non-cooperative
game theory. The Nash bargaining solution of a game maximises (xu −zu)(xd −zd), subject to
(xu, xd) ∈ F , where F is the feasible set of payoff vectors and (zu, zd) are non-cooperative
payoffs (cf. Osborne and Rubinstein 1994). Here, the non-water transfers are calculated
according to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution.1
We analyse the stability of cooperation using an infinitely repeated game—a common
approach in the analysis of international environmental agreements (cf. Finus 2002)—because
water allocation agreements typically do not have a specified termination date. The stage
game in year t is played as follows. First, a value of Qt is realised from its probability
distribution and observed by the countries. Second, u chooses qu,t . If complying with the
agreement, u plays qu,t = qcu,t according to the selected sharing rule. If not complying,
u plays qu,t = qnu,t = min{q¯u,t , Qt }. Third, d observes u’s action and chooses mt . If com-
plying with the agreement, d plays mt = mct (which equals m I or mIIt , as specified in the
agreement). If not complying, d plays mt = mnt = 0. Fourth, countries observe the strategy
played by the other country and receive payoffs.
The decision to comply or not comply in year t is based on the expected payoff stream:
E(i,t ) = max
(
E(ci,t ), E(
n
i,t )
)
. We re-interpret the common reactions to noncompli-
ance discussed in Sect. 2 to punishment strategies. We assume that both countries use a trigger
strategy: when a country is not complying, it is punished by the other country in the form
of p years non-cooperative play of the stage game, after which countries expect to return to
cooperative play (i.e. agreement strategies). The type of punishment used here differs from
Bennett and Howe (1998), who used monetary penalties in their analysis of cooperation
between US states. Based on the examples presented in Sect. 2, we assume here that there
is no authority that can issue such penalties in case of noncompliance. The expected payoff
streams to u and d for compliance in year t equal:
1 Two alternative methods to calculate non-water transfers are the Shapley value and Nucleolus, solution
concepts from cooperative game theory.
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E(cu,t ) = Bcu,t + mc +
∞∑
τ=t+1
δτ−t [E(Bcu,τ ) + E(mcτ )] (6)
E(cd,t ) = Bcd,t − mc +
∞∑
τ=t+1
δτ−t [E(Bcd,τ ) − E(mcτ )] (7)
where δ is the discount factor. The expected payoff streams to u and d for noncompliance in
year t equal:
E(nu,t ) = Bnu,t +
t+p∑
τ=t+1
δτ−t [E(Bnu,τ )] +
∞∑
τ=t+p+1
δτ−t [E(Bcu,τ ) + E(mcτ )] (8)
E(nd,t ) = Bcd,t +
t+p∑
τ=t+1
δτ−t [E(Bnd,τ )] +
∞∑
τ=t+p+1
δτ−t [E(Bcd,τ ) − E(mcτ )] (9)
The differences, Du and Dd , equal the increase in expected payoffs due to noncompliance
by u or d:2
Du = Bnu,t − Bcu,t − mc +
t+p∑
τ=t+1
δτ−t [E(Bnu,τ ) − E(Bcu,τ ) − E(mcτ )] (10)
Dd = mc +
t+p∑
τ=t+1
δτ−t [E(Bnd,τ ) − E(Bcd,τ ) + E(mcτ )] (11)
Positive values of Di imply that country i has an incentive to deviate from the agreement.
Substituting Eqs. 4 and 5 into Eqs. 10 and 11, we can derive Du and Dd for the two types of
transfers, see the Appendix. For type I transfers, Dd is independent from the level of Qt and
therefore constant for a given probability distribution of Q. Because an agreement would not
be signed if Dd ≥ 0 at the expected value of river flow, we consider only those situations
where Dd is negative for any Qt . Therefore, d will never have an incentive to deviate from
the agreement.
For type II transfers, Du depends on a share of non-cooperative benefits minus cooper-
ative benefits at current river flow plus the negative punishment term. Because cooperation
is attractive—see Eq. 3—we know that Du < 0, which implies that u will never have an
incentive to deviate from the agreement.
Concluding this section, the type of transfers that is used has implications for countries’
incentives to comply with the agreement. With type I (constant) transfers, d never has an
incentive to deviate from the agreement, but u may deviate if gains from non-cooperation
outweigh the fixed transfer. With type II (flexible) transfers, u never has an incentive to devi-
ate from the agreement, but d may deviate if the transfer outweighs its foregone benefits in
the punishment period. In the next section, we will assess the stability of cooperation with
climate change effects and different sharing rules.
2 Note that we calculate Dd assuming that u complies with the agreement. Because we are primarily interested
in the stability of the agreement—and not payoffs or efficiency—it is irrelevant which of the two countries
deviates in a certain year. Any anticipated noncompliance by u (because it expects d to not comply in that
year) does therefore not affect the results.
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4 Analysing Stability
The folk theorem tells us that cooperation can be sustained in equilibrium as long as
punishments are severe enough. When discounted payoffs of cooperation outweigh the sum
of discounted payoffs of noncompliance in one year and Nash-payoffs during the subsequent
punishment phase, an agreement is stable in that particular year.
Because of the uncertainty of payoffs in our model, through the stochastic variable Q,
it is not possible to assess whether cooperation is stable or not. It is, however, possible to
assess the probability of stability. To do this, we need to determine values of Qt for which
the agreement is not stable in year t ; i.e. where either Du ≥ 0 or Dd ≥ 0. Let the set Qˆ ⊂ Q
contain these values. We know that Qˆ is a proper subset of Q, because an agreement would
not be signed if Du ≥ 0 or Dd ≥ 0 at the expected value of river flow. Therefore E(Qt ) /∈ Qˆ.
Because benefit functions Bi,t (qi,t ) are increasing and concave (see Sect. 3), we can derive
some properties of Du and Dd that help to specify Qˆ further, using Eqs. 10 and 11 and the
fact that qnu,t ≥ qcu,t . In case of type I transfers, Du is a single-peaked function of Qt , and
Dd has a constant negative value. In case of type II transfers, Dd is a single-peaked function
of Qt , and Du is always negative. This implies that, for both type I and II transfers, Qˆ is a
continuous set. Because Qˆ is a continuous set, and because we focus on water scarcity, we
assume that Qt < E(Qt ) ∀ Qt ∈ Qˆ. This assumption is based on the idea that scarcity is
the cause of instability of water allocation agreements, as discussed in Sect. 2.
Having specified Qˆ, we can express the probability of stability as Pr [Qt /∈ Qˆ]. Given
that f (Q) is the probability density function of Q, we can calculate Pr [Qt /∈ Qˆ] as the area
under f (Q) where Qt /∈ Qˆ. Denote lower and upper bounds of Qˆ by Qˆ− and Qˆ+, then the
probability of stability of an agreement equals:
Pr [Qt /∈ Qˆ] = 1 −
∫ Qˆ+
Qˆ−
f (Q)d Q (12)
Equation (12) is illustrated in Fig. 1. In the remainder of this paper we will use this expression
as our stability indicator and refer to it simply as “stability”.
We are interested in probability density functions of Q without and with climate change.
A comparison of the stability in each situation shows how climate change affects the sta-
bility of cooperation. Because Qˆ− and Qˆ+ are constant (i.e. independent from f (Q)), we
can compare stability of an agreement for f (Q) (no climate change) and f ′(Q) (climate
change). Stability in a situation with climate change is lower when it decreases Pr [Qt /∈ Qˆ],
increasing the size of the shaded area in Fig. 1. Climate change is expected to affect river
flow through the combined effects of changes in temperature, evaporation, soil moisture,
and precipitation. Two general results of climate simulation models are (i) increased runoff
variability, both within seasons and within years, and (ii) an increase of river flow in cold
river basins and a decrease in warmer regions (cf. Arnell 1999; Räisänen et al. 2004; IPCC
2007a). For the probability distribution of Q this implies a change in the mean river flow and
an increased variance of river flow.
Note that climate change effects do not affect stability if Qˆ = ∅. If an agreement is stable
for f (Q), it is stable for any f ′(Q) 	= f (Q). If Qˆ 	= ∅, climate change effects on stability
depend on whether they affect the size of the shaded area in Fig. 1. Note that the exact location
and size of this shaded area depend on whether type I or type II transfers are used.
Recall that we assume Qt < E(Qt ) ∀ Qt ∈ Qˆ. Clearly, the functional form of f (Q)
has implications for climate change effects on stability. Commonly applied distributions in
the literature on probabilistic hydrological forecasting include the gamma and (log-) normal
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Qˆ− Qˆ+ Q ≈ E(Qt) Q
f(Q)
Fig. 1 An example of a (gamma) probability density function for Qt . Stability is calculated according to
Eq. 12; it equals the area under f (Q) excluding the shaded area
distributions (cf. Bobee and Ashkar 1991). In a survey of close to 1000 sites worldwide,
Finlayson and McMahon (1992) found that the annual streamflow of about 60% of these
sites can be approximated by the normal distribution. This implies that f (Q) is continuous,
increasing up to E(Qt ), and symmetric by approximation (Fig. 1 depicts a gamma distribution
that is approximately symmetric).
An increased variance of river flow implies that more weight is given to the tails of the
probability density function. The effect of increased variance therefore depends on the size
and location of Qˆ. The only information on the lower and upper bounds of Qˆ we have is
that Qˆ− ≤ Qˆ+ < E(Qt ). The size and location of Qˆ are bounded only by the lowest value
of Q and E(Qt ). Therefore, the effect of increased variance of river flow on stability can
be positive or negative. If Qˆ− is located close to the lowest value of Q, an increased variance
is likely to increase the size of the shaded area and decrease stability. If Qˆ+ is located close
to E(Qt ), an increased variance is likely to decrease the size of the shaded area and increase
stability.
Consider a decreasing mean river flow. Because of the properties of f (Q), established
above, a decreasing mean river flow will decreases stability as long as f (Qˆ−) ≤ f (Qˆ+), see
Fig. 2. The reverse holds for increasing mean river flow. Because of symmetry of f (Q),
we know that E(Qt ) ≈ Q, where Q equals Q for which f (Q) is maximised, see
Fig. 1. Therefore, we can generalise that f (Qˆ−) ≤ f (Qˆ+) ∀ Qˆ. Consequently, a decrease
(increase) in mean river flow decreases (increases) stability. More formally, given the above
observations we have:
1 −
∫ Qˆ+
Qˆ−
f (Q)d Q > 1 −
∫ Qˆ+
Qˆ−
f ′(Q)d Q if E(Qt )| f (Q) > E(Qt )| f ′(Q) (13)
This proofs the following result:
Result 1 Stability of a water allocation agreement depends on the probability density func-
tion of river flow. Stability decreases if mean river flow decreases. An increased variance can
have a positive or a negative effect on stability.
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(b) Dd for type II transfers
Fig. 2 The increase in expected payoffs due to noncompliance to u and d, for different levels of Qt and
different sharing rules
Note that this result holds for both types of transfers, although the size of the effect may
be different.
We expect the stability of cooperation to be different for different sharing rules. To ver-
ify this expectation, we compare Qˆ for the three sharing rules. In the comparison, we set
αE(Qt ) = β = E(Qt ) − γ , such that at Qt = E(Qt ) the water allocation is similar for
each sharing rule. In calculating Qˆ from Eqs. 10 and 11 we can ignore all constant elements,
such as the punishment terms, because they are equal for all three sharing rules. Because
we assume that all elements in Qˆ lie below E(Qt ), we only look at the situation where
Qt < E(Qt ). Note that if Qt < E(Qt ), we have Qt − γ < αQt < β.
In case of type I transfers, we use Eq. 10, from which we cancel all constant terms, which
leaves the term −Bcu,t to be compared for the three sharing rules. For type I transfers, we
find that DF Du > DP Au > DFUu ∀ Qt < E(Qt ). In case of type II transfers, we use Eq. 11,
from which we cancel all constant terms, which leaves the term (Bcu,t + Bcd,t ) − Bcu,t to
be compared for the three sharing rules. For type II transfers, we find that DF Dd > D
P A
d >
DFUd ∀ Qt < E(Qt ). Because both Du and Dd are single-peaked, we have for both types
of transfers:
QˆFU ⊂ Qˆ P A ⊂ QˆF D (14)
Because stability is defined according to Eq. 12, stability is highest for FU and lowest for
FD. Formally, from Eqs. 12 and 14 we can construct:
1 −
∫ Qˆ+FU
Qˆ−FU
f (Q)d Q > 1 −
∫ Qˆ+P A
Qˆ−P A
f (Q)d Q > 1 −
∫ Qˆ+F D
Qˆ−F D
f (Q)d Q (15)
This proofs the following result:
Result 2 Stability of a water allocation agreement depends on the sharing rule. It is higher for
fixed upstream allocation than for proportional allocation and lowest for fixed downstream
allocation.
For type I transfers, this result is a direct consequence of the amount of risk connected to
low flows that is allocated to u. For FU, this risk is minimised as u receives a fixed amount of
water, constrained only by the amount of river flow available. For FD, this risk is maximised
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because if river flow decreases by one unit, the allocation to u may also decrease by one unit.
For PA, this risk lies somewhere between those of FU and FD.
For type II transfers, the intuition behind this result is that the transfer includes a
compensation for benefits foregone to u. For Qt < E(Qt ), this compensation is higher
for FD than for PA and lowest for FU. Because of the Stackelberg setting, d first receives
water and then decides whether or not to pay the transfer. The size of the transfer relative to
the punishment term determines whether d complies with the agreement. Clearly, incentives
for noncompliance are higher for FD than for PA and lowest for FU.
Taking a closer look at FU with type I transfers, we find that u can never have an incentive
to deviate from the agreement. To prove this result, we show that Du for type I transfers—see
Eq. 10—is always negative for FU. First we find the value of qu,t for which Du is maxi-
mised. Note that we can ignore the punishment term and non-water transfers because they
are constant, so we consider the maximisation problem maxqu,t Bnu,t − Bcu,t . There are three
possibilities:
1. if Qt < β < q¯u,t then qnu,t = Qt and qcu,t = Qt ;
2. if β < Qt < q¯u,t then qnu,t = Qt and qcu,t = β;
3. if q¯u,t ≤ Qt then qnu,t = q¯u,t and qcu,t = β.
Clearly, in the last situation, Bnu,t −Bcu,t is maximised. We argue that the last situation includes
Qt = E(Qt ), because we assume that q¯u,t ≤ E(Qt ). This assumption is based on the idea
that in the short term, u’s economy and infrastructure are not designed to abstract and use
(much) more water than is expected in a given year.3 Because we may assume that Du < 0
and that Du is maximised for Qt = E(Qt ), we know that Du < 0 for any level of Qt . It
follows that Qˆ = ∅ for FU with type I transfers. Hence Pr [Qt /∈ Qˆ] = 1; FU with type I
transfers is stable. This proofs the following result:
Result 3 Water allocation agreements with fixed upstream allocation and type I transfers are
stable for any level of river flow.
5 Asymmetry
In this section, we assess the effects on stability of asymmetry in political power and benefit
functions. For both factors we assess how they affect stability before and after an agreement
has been signed.
As described by LeMarquand (1977), the distribution of political power has implications
for the incentives for cooperation. In our model we can incorporate this aspect through the
level of , which we define here to be a measure of political power for the upstream country.
When benefit functions are symmetric, Kilgour and Dinar (2001) have shown that in an effi-
cient situation, the surplus benefit is equally shared between the two countries; in our model
this implies that  = 0.5.
When  < 0.5, d has more political power than u and therefore a stronger bargain-
ing position. As a result, the non-water transfer from d to u is lower than in a situation
with equally distributed political power. To assess the effect of political power on stability,
we take the derivative of Eq. 10 for type I transfers and (11) for type II transfers, with
respect to :
3 If q¯u,t  E(Qt ), FU is unstable for Qt large enough.
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∂ Du
∂
=
t+p∑
τ=t
δτ−t E
[
(Bnd,τ + Bnu,τ ) − (Bcd,τ + Bcu,τ )
]
< 0 (16)
∂ Dd
∂
= (Bcd,t + Bcu,t ) − (Bnd,t + Bnu,t )
+
t+p∑
τ=t+1
δτ−t E
[
(Bcd,τ + Bcu,τ ) − (Bnd,τ + Bnu,τ )
]
> 0 (17)
Because of Eq. 3, Eq. 16 yields a negative and Eq. 17 yields a positive value. For type I
transfers, an increase of  leads to a decrease of Du , increasing the stability for each level
of river flow. For type II transfers, an increase of  leads to an increase of Dd , decreasing
the stability for each level of river flow. This result holds for each sharing rule. The intuition
behind this result is that when  is high, the non-water transfer is high relative to benefits
foregone to u, making cooperation more attractive to u and less attractive to d .
For type I transfers, changes in the distribution of political power after an agreement has
been signed have no effect on stability because the effect of  on Du works via m I , which has
been fixed. Of course, it is well possible that a change in political power leads to renegotia-
tions of the terms of the agreement, with a more favourable outcome for the more powerful
country. If the upstream country is the winner of these renegotiations,  will increase, Du will
decrease and the agreement will be more stable. If the downstream country is the winner of
these renegotiations,  will decrease, Du will increase and the agreement will be less stable.
Asymmetry in benefit functions between countries is assessed by scaling u′s benefit func-
tion by a factor η: Bu,t = ηh(qu,t ) and Bd,t = h(qd,t ). To assess the effect on stability for
both types of transfers, we analyse how η affects Du and Dd by taking the derivatives of
Eq. 10 for type I transfers and Eq. 11 for type II transfers, with respect to η:
∂ Du
∂η
= h(qnu,τ ) − h(qcu,τ ) +
t+p∑
τ=t+1
δτ−t
[
E[h(qnu,τ )] − E[h(qcu,τ )]
]
> 0 (18)
∂ Dd
∂η
= (1 − )[h(qnu,τ ) − h(qcu,τ )]
+
t+p∑
τ=t+1
δτ−t (1 − ) [E[h(qnu,τ )] − E[h(qcu,τ )]
]
> 0 (19)
Equations 18 and 19 both yield positive values, because the non-cooperative benefits to u out-
weigh the cooperative benefits, both at current and expected levels of river flow. An increase
of η leads to an increase of Du with type I transfers and Dd with type II transfers, decreasing
the stability for each level of river flow. This result holds for each sharing rule. For any agree-
ment, the higher the marginal benefits of water use to u compared with those to d , the lower
the stability of cooperation. The intuition behind this result is as follows. For type I transfers,
higher marginal benefits to u increase its expected payoffs of noncompliance more than the
transfer it receives from d . For type II transfers, higher marginal benefits to u increase the
transfer that d has to pay to u, giving d a higher incentive to deviate.
For type I transfers, changes in η after an agreement has been signed can also be calcu-
lated. Such a change may occur because of demographic or economic developments. This
effect does not influence m I , because m I has been fixed in the agreement. Therefore, to
assess the effect on stability, we analyse how η affects Du by taking the derivative of Eq. 10
with respect to η, similar to Eq. 18, but assuming that m I is fixed:
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∂m I
∂η
= 0 (20)
Combining Eqs. 18 and 20 gives:
∂ Du
∂η
= h(qnu,τ ) − h(qcu,τ ) +
t+p∑
τ=t+1
δτ−t
[
E[h(qnu,τ )] − E[h(qcu,τ )]
]
> 0 (21)
Equation 21 yields a positive value. For type I transfers, an increase of η after an agreement
has been signed leads to an increase of Du , decreasing the stability for each level of river
flow. This result holds for each sharing rule. For any agreement, if marginal benefits to u
increase after the agreement has been signed, the stability of cooperation decreases.
The results of this section are summarised in result 4. Given derivatives (16)–(19) and (21),
a positive sign of the derivative indicates an upward shift of the Du or Dd curve, see
Eqs. 10 and 11. Because these curves are single-peaked, an upward shift of the Du or Dd curve
decreases Qˆ− and increases Qˆ+, which decreases the stability indicator 1 − ∫ Qˆ+Qˆ− f (Q)d Q.
This proofs the following result:
Result 4 Stability of a water allocation agreement depends on the level of symmetry of the
countries. For type I (type II) transfers, stability is higher (lower) when the upstream county
has more political power. For both types of transfers, stability is higher when the upstream
country has lower benefits of water use than the downstream country.
6 Numerical Example
To illustrate model results 1–3, we use the following numerical example:
Bi,t = 75qi,t − 1.5q2i,t E(Qt ) = 40
δ = 0.95 α = 0.5
p = 5 β = 20
 = 0.5 γ = 20
The values for α, β, and γ are chosen such that at Qt = E(Qt ) the water allocation is similar
for each sharing rule. Because the countries have identical benefit functions, the allocation is
optimal when Qt = E(Qt ).4 Furthermore, for each sharing rule, cooperation is attractive to
both countries for Qt = E(Qt ), because countries would never agree to cooperate if there
was no expected gain from cooperation.
Figure 2 plots Du and Dd for different levels of Qt , for the three sharing rules. For
both sub-figures, we observe that the size of Qˆ for the three sharing rules is according to
Eq. 14. Corresponding to results 2 and 3, the incentive to deviate is highest for FD and lowest
for FU. Figure 2 shows that efficiency does not guarantee stability. Because the countries
have identical benefit functions, PA provides a Pareto-efficient water allocation for each level
of Qt . Nevertheless, Fig. 2 shows that this efficient allocation is not always stable. The reason
for the decrease in Du and Dd for Qt less than ±20 is the decreasing gain of noncompliance
relative to the punishment.
4 Because the countries have identical benefit functions in this example, PA will provide a more efficient
allocation than FU or FD when climate change effects occur: the total benefits of water use are maximised.
This property of the model is similar to results from efficiency studies that were surveyed in the introductory
section of this paper (cf. Bennett et al. 2000).
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Fig. 3 Stability—Pr [Qt /∈ Qˆ]—of an agreement with a PA sharing rule when climate change affects the
mean river flow or the variance of river flow. Mean and variance are based on f ′(Q), the probability density
function of Qt when climate change effects occur. Similar graphs can be derived for FU and FD, the only
difference being a horizontal shift of the curves
The stability of cooperation depends on the probability distribution of Q. In this example
we use an (approximately symmetric) gamma distribution to describe f (Q) and f ′(Q). The
effect of a change in the mean or variance of river flow on the stability of cooperation is
shown in Fig. 3, for PA and both types of transfers. The mean river flow refers to the mean
of f ′(Q), the probability density function of Qt when climate change effects occur.5
Figure 3 illustrates result 1: a decrease in mean river flow decreases stability. When mean
river flow decreases beyond Qˆ+, the effect of changes in variance switches sign, illustrating
that an increase in variance can have positive or negative effects on stability. Note that the
fact that type I transfers are more stable than type II transfers is due to this specific numerical
example.
7 Discussion
The analysis presented here shows that climate change affects the stability of water allocation
agreements. The precise effect on stability depends on (i) the characteristics of the river basin:
its hydrological regime and the effects of climate change on river flow, and (ii) the charac-
teristics of the agreement: in particular the sharing rule, the type of non-water transfers, the
countries’ benefit functions, and the distribution of political power. Because the results show
that stability decreases when water becomes more scarce, this result is mostly relevant for
arid regions. It is less relevant for humid regions and not relevant for regions facing (only)
water quality issues: the impact of climate change on water quality is too complicated in
hydrological terms to be captured in a simple model as the one presented here.
Mendelsohn and Bennett (1997) find that the impact of climate change on the mean river
flow is a far more important determinant for efficiency than its impact on the variance of river
5 The calculation of expected benefits is still based on E(Q) = 40—the mean of the original probability den-
sity function f (Q)—because the agreement will not be immediately adapted at the first signs of climate change
effects on river flow. Governments need reliable information before they are willing to change conditions of
this type of agreements; long-term observations are needed before a change in the probability distribution of
river flow can be assessed. Note that a change in river flow that results in a mean below 20 is not included in
Fig. 3. For this type of extreme changes in mean river flow it would not be realistic to assume that the expected
level of river flow remains E(Qt ) = 40.
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flow. Our model suggests that this conclusion may not hold for the stability of cooperation.
Stability is affected by changes in both mean and variance of river flow, so both have to be
taken into account when negotiating agreements on water allocation.
Besides economic gain, there are other issues that influence the allocation of water to
riparian countries and the stability of cooperation. First, as the example of the Nile river
basin points out, acquired water rights can be an important determinant in the allocation of
river water. A sharing rule based on acquired rights is not expected to be optimal from the
points of view of efficiency and stability. Second, risk aversion might play a role. A country
receiving a fixed allocation faces a lower risk of flow variability than a country that receives
a non-fixed allocation or a proportional allocation (cf. Bennett et al. 2000). More risk-averse
countries will prefer fixed allocations over proportional allocations. We expect stability to
be positively affected by risk aversion as risk averse countries would appraise the certitude
of cooperative benefits above non-cooperative benefits more than risk neutral countries.
Two approaches could be used to decrease the risk associated with low flows and gener-
ate more stable agreements. First, both u and d could decide to invest in reservoir capacity.
When managed properly, reservoirs can provide a buffer in water supply, decreasing the
dependency on river water in low flow years (Janmaat and Ruijs 2007). Second, a water
allocation agreement can be extended with water trading, which could increase stability (cf.
Booker and Young 1994). Water markets can improve the efficiency of existing water allo-
cations such that both countries benefit. Both approaches reduce the incentive to break an
existing agreement.
In theory, the use of punishment strategies enhances cooperation in a repeated game. In
our model, however, punishment decreases payoffs of both the punished and the punishing
country, because the non-cooperative outcome gives the punishing country lower payoffs than
the cooperative outcome. Shortening the punishment period is therefore always beneficial
to the punishing country. This undermines its credibility of actually going to punish in case
of noncompliance. A lack of credibility of punishment strategies can obstruct the effective
use of punishment strategies in international agreements on water allocation (Carraro et al.
2005). The examples in Sect. 2, however, show that this type of behaviour is not common.
Moreover, the punishment period can be used by the harmed country to gain international
support in the dispute over water, which can strengthen its bargaining position in renegotia-
tions. Ideally, punishment is implemented in a linked game, which does not affect the benefits
of the punishing country.
8 Conclusions
The objective of this paper is to assess the stability of water allocation agreements when
climate change affects river flow. A game theoretic model is constructed that analyses the
stability of cooperation in water allocation between two countries for three sharing rules. The
stability of cooperation is expressed in terms of the probability that one of the two countries
does not comply with the specified agreement actions, given that the countries maximise
their expected payoff stream (consisting of benefits of water use and non-water transfers).
For each sharing rule, deviation from agreement actions is found unattractive to the down-
stream country (d) with constant transfers and unattractive to the upstream country (u) with
flexible transfers. The stability of agreements depends on the probability distribution of Q.
Our results show that a decrease in mean river flow decreases the stability of cooperation. An
increased variance can have a positive or a negative effect on stability. Of the three sharing
rules that were analysed, agreements with FU are more stable than those with PA and FD,
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for both constant and flexible transfers. With constant transfers, FU was found stable for any
level of river flow.
In addition to the probability distribution of river flow and the sharing rule, three other
factors are identified to affect stability of cooperation. The stability of cooperation is higher
if the absolute value of the punishment term is higher, and if u’s benefits of water use are low
relative to d’s benefits. If u’s political power is large relative to d’s political power, stability
is higher for constant transfers, but lower for flexible transfers.
This paper shows that the stability of water allocation agreements can be affected by
climate change. This paper adds to the analysis of water allocation agreements by focusing
on stability aspects, where others have focused on efficiency aspects. Where Bennett et al.
(2000) found that proportional allocations are more efficient in many situations, we find that
proportional allocations are less stable than fixed upstream allocations. Where Mendelsohn
and Bennett (1997) found that the largest impact of climate change on efficiency comes from
changes in the mean river flow, we find that both changes in mean and variance affect stability.
Because water allocation agreements need to be stable in order to increase the efficiency of
water use, the results of this paper are important for the design of water allocation agreements
and especially the selection of a sharing rule.
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Appendix
Substituting Eq. 4 into Eq. 10 for type I transfers yields:
Du = Bnu,t − Bcu,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
−E(Bnu,t ) + E(Bcu,t )︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
−
t+p∑
τ=t
δτ−t
[
E(Bcd,τ ) + E(Bcu,τ ) − E(Bnd,τ ) − E(Bnu,τ )
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
Dd = E(Bnu,t ) − E(Bcu,t )︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+ [E(Bcd,t ) + E(Bcu,t ) − E(Bnd,t ) − E(Bnu,t )
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
(
 + ( − 1)
t+p∑
τ=t+1
δτ−t
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
with  and p such that Dd < 0 at E(Qt ).
Substituting Eq. 5 into Eq. 11 for type II transfers yields:
Du = 
[
(Bnd,t + Bnu,t ) − (Bcd,t + Bcu,t )
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
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+
t+p∑
τ=t+1
δτ−t (1 − ) [E(Bnu,τ ) + E(Bnd,τ ) − E(Bcu,τ ) − E(Bcd,τ )
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
Dd = Bnu,t − Bcu,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+ [Bcu,t + Bcd,t − Bnu,t − Bnd,t
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+
t+p∑
τ=t+1
δτ−t (1 − ) [E(Bnu,τ ) + E(Bnd,τ ) − E(Bcu,τ ) − E(Bcd,τ )
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
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